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CLASS ACTION SETTLEMENTS: RES JUDICATA, RELEASE,
AND THE IDENTICAL FACTUAL PREDICATE DOCTRINE
KRIS J. KOSTOLANSKY * & DIANE R. HAZEL **
ABSTRACT
The “identical factual predicate” rule is a judicial doctrine that limits the
preclusive scope of class settlements. Under the doctrine, a release in a
class settlement can release only those claims sharing an identical factual
predicate with the settled class claims. Although it is undisputed the doctrine limits preclusion under the affirmative defense of release, the doctrine
also limits res judicata. To date, the circuits have adopted inconsistent positions on whether the doctrine also limits res judicata, and the Supreme
Court has not provided guidance. This article explains that the doctrine applies with equal force to res judicata. In the class settlement context, the
court must enter a final judgment approving the settlement before the settlement becomes final. But as part of the final judgment, the court can only
release claims that share an identical factual predicate. The doctrine is thus
embedded within the final judgment prong of res judicata.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The settlement of a class action lawsuit should ideally resolve all issues and
claims involved in the class litigation for all class members who do not opt out.
When a putative class member raises similar claims—or claims based on similar
facts—in a subsequent case, questions regarding res judicata and the scope of the
class release arise inevitably. The resolution of these issues pits the important doctrines of judicial economy and finality against the equally important doctrines of
due process and reasonable expectations.
To address these competing interests, the majority of circuits have adopted
the “identical factual predicate” doctrine (“IFPD”). The IFPD permits a broad release
of claims—including claims that were not pursued in the underlying class litigation—if the party raising the defense can show an identical factual predicate between the underlying class claims and subsequent claims. 1 The precise meaning of
“identical factual predicate” remains subject to interpretation and is evolving within
the federal circuit courts. Specifically, the circuit courts have adopted inconsistent
positions on whether the doctrine requires a stricter identity of facts than that required under res judicata. Some courts have even conflated the two standards underlying res judicata and release. Although no circuit seems to dispute that the IFPD
applies to the affirmative defense of release, the circuit courts’ varying interpretations of the IFPD have left open the question of whether the doctrine also applies
to the defense of res judicata. To further compound the uncertainty, there has been
no direct guidance from the U.S. Supreme Court.
This article will define the IFPD and explain why the doctrine should apply with
equal force to the affirmative defenses of release and res judicata. The IFPD is not
equivalent to the same transaction or occurrence element under res judicata. To
reach a final judgment on the merits in a class settlement, the underlying court must
approve the settlement containing the release. 2 In approving the settlement and
release, a court must determine that the released claims arise from the identical
factual predicate. 3 This process, applied correctly, imbeds the IFPD into the res judicata defense.
This article first discusses the affirmative defenses of res judicata and release
and how these defenses may be asserted following a class action settlement. The
article proceeds to discuss the structure of class settlements and how this structure—combined with judicial review—balances the competing interests of finality
and due process. Finally, with this context, the article explains how the identical
factual predicate doctrine applies to both release and res judicata.
II. THE DISTINCT DOCTRINES OF RES JUDICATA & RELEASE
To understand IFPD in the context of a class settlement, it is first necessary to
understand the defenses under which an identical factual predicate analysis may
arise. Res judicata, or claim preclusion, “generally refers to the effect of a prior
1.
2.
3.

See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Visa U.S.A., Inc., 396 F.3d 96, 107–09 (2d Cir. 2000).
Reyn’s Pasta Bella, LLC v. Visa USA, Inc., 442 F.3d 741, 746 (9th Cir. 2006).
See Hesse v. Sprint Corp., 598 F.3d 581, 590–91 (9th Cir. 2010).
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judgment in foreclosing successive litigation of the very same claim.” 4 For a claim
to be precluded under the doctrine of res judicata, the following elements must be
met: “(1) a valid, final judgment on the merits . . . ; (2) claims arising out of the same
transaction and occurrence as the initial judgment;” and (3) identity of parties. 5 Although these elements may vary slightly by circuit, each circuit uses some version of
this test, and all circuits require that there be a final judgment. If res judicata applies, the doctrine precludes claims that were raised or could have been raised. 6 As
a result, not only does res judicata bar claims that were brought in the first forum,
but it also bars all claims relating to the same transaction against the same defendant that could have been brought. 7 Res judicata also may be used as an affirmative
defense in a later litigation when the prior action involved a class settlement because a court adjudicating the class case must enter a final judgment approving the
settlement. 8
Release differs from res judicata in that a class settlement may be drafted
broadly to release claims that were not asserted and might not have been asserted
in the class action. Because a release may reach claims that could not have been
asserted in the initial class action, courts have developed a requirement that the
release may only reach claims that stem from an identical factual predicate as those
in the underlying action. Thus, the settling defendant may only buy a release that
extends up to and not beyond the IFPD. 9
The party seeking preclusion has the burden of raising these affirmative defenses. 10 Otherwise, the defenses are waived. 11 Res judicata applies to class judgments generally. The release defense only arises where there has been a class settlement. Thus, even though release and res judicata are distinct defenses, in the

4. New Hampshire v. Maine, 532 U.S. 742, 748 (2001).
5. WILLIAM B. RUBENSTEIN, NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS §§ 18:6, 18:15. (5th ed. 2018). In the class
context, absent class members are not technically parties. Once a class is certified, absent class members
are considered parties for preclusion purposes. See also Taylor v. Sturgell, 553 U.S. 880, 894–95 (2008)
(“Representative suits with preclusive effect on nonparties include properly conducted class actions and
suits brought by trustees, guardians, and other fiduciaries.”) (internal citations omitted); Devlin v.
Scardelletti, 536 U.S. 1, 9–10 (2002) (“[N]onnamed class members . . . may be parties for some purposes
and not for others. The label ‘party’ does not indicate an absolute characteristic, but rather a conclusion
about the applicability of various procedural rules that may differ based on context.”).
6. Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 94 (1980).
7. E.g., Covert v. LVNV Funding, LLC, 779 F.3d 242, 247 (4th Cir. 2015) (finding statutory claims
that could have been raised in earlier litigation barred by res judicata); Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v.
Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 322 F.3d 1064, 1078 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding plaintiffs barred from bringing
their claims because claims arising from same transactional nucleus of fact could have been brought); see
N. Assurance Co. of Am. v. Square D Co., 201 F.3d 84, 87–88 (2d Cir. 2000) (explaining that claim preclusion
barring claims that could have been brought stems from requirement that plaintiff must bring all claims at
once against the same defendant relating to the same transaction or event).
8. A judgment approving a class settlement satisfies the “final judgment” criteria of res judicata.
See FED. R. CIV. P. 8(c)(1).
9. See TBK Partners, Ltd. v. W. Union Corp., 675 F.2d 456, 460 (2d Cir. 1982) (explaining that a
court may permit release of a claim based on the identical factual predicate as underlying claims in settled
class action).
10. See FED. R. CIV. P. 8(c)(1).
11. Id.
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class action settlement context this article will demonstrate that both are circumscribed by the IFPD.
III. THE STRUCTURE OF CLASS SETTLEMENTS
Class settlements generally include certain features that ensure the finality of
claims and protect absent class members’ interests. During a class settlement, parties to the settlement agreement typically include a broad release of claims. Releases “are a standard feature of class action settlements.” 12 In such a release, the
parties will agree to release the claims currently at issue in the litigation as well as
other claims that were not presented to the court. The defendants’ desire to protect themselves from future claims, coupled with the class plaintiffs’ desire to maximize the settlement amount, often produce an expansive release.
As a general rule, courts allow releases encompassing a broader set of claims
than those asserted in the class complaint. 13 Courts permit the release of a broader
range of claims to “promot[e] judicial economy by preventing the relitigation of settled questions resolved in comprehensive settlement agreements.” 14 Further, defendants might be unwilling to settle with a class unless they can obtain a broad
release designed to limit future liability. Without some limitation on liability and
exposure, defendants “would otherwise face nearly limitless liability from related
lawsuits in jurisdictions throughout the country.” 15 As part of such broad releases,
courts have allowed the release of claims not only pled but also the release of claims
that were “not presented and might not have [even] been presentable.” 16
Before a class settlement with a release is finalized, the court must enter a
judgment approving the settlement. 17 Court approval is a two-step process. 18 First,
the court must “determin[e] whether the proposed settlement falls within the
range of possible approval and whether it is reasonable to issue notification to settlement class members of the settlement’s terms.” 19 Assuming the Court issues preliminary approval, notice is distributed and absent class members have an opportunity to object. 20 In the second step, after notice and the opportunity for absent
class members to be heard, the court will determine whether to grant final

12. Berry v. Schulman, 807 F.3d 600, 616 (4th Cir. 2015).
13. See, e.g., id. (“In class action settlements, parties may release not only the very claims raised
in their cases, but also claims arising out of the ‘identical factual predicate.’”).
14. Freeman v. MML Bay State Life Ins. Co., 445 F. App’x 577, 579 (3d Cir. 2011) (citing In re
Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. Sales Prac. Litig., 261 F.3d 355, 366 (3d Cir. 2001)).
15. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 396 F.3d at 106 (“Broad class action settlements are common, since
defendants and their cohorts would otherwise face nearly limitless liability from related lawsuits in jurisdictions throughout the country. Practically speaking, ‘[c]lass action settlements simply will not occur if the
parties cannot set definitive limits on defendants’ liability.’”).
16. TBK Partners, 675 F.2d at 460 (2d Cir. 1982).
17. See RUBENSTEIN, supra note 5, at §18:15.
18. Id.
19. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e)(2). For a judgment to be enforceable, the judgment must have been rendered with due process. Pelt v. Utah, 539 F.3d 1271, 1284 (10th Cir. 2008) (“The preclusive effect of a prior
judgment will depend upon whether absent class members were ‘in fact’ adequately represented by parties
who are present” and will not bind absent class members “if they were not accorded due process of law”).
20. Pelt, 539 F.3d at 1284.
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approval. 21 The court may only approve the settlement “after a hearing and on finding that [the settlement] is fair, reasonable, and adequate.” 22
A judgment in a class action lawsuit binds all members of the class and prevents class members from later bringing claims over the same transaction or occurrence in a future lawsuit if they have met IFPD. 23 Generally, by “precluding parties
from contesting matters that they have had a full and fair opportunity to litigate,”
the doctrine of preclusion “protect[s] against the expense and vexation attending
multiple lawsuits, conserve[s] judicial resources, and foster[s] reliance on judicial
action by minimizing the possibility of inconsistent decisions.” 24
IV. DUE PROCESS CONCERNS RAISED BY CLASS SETTLEMENTS
Class settlements augment some of the concerns that accompany the conclusion of class claims. As a form of representative litigation, the named class members
litigate, and settle, on behalf of a group of absent class members. 25 As a result, absent class members will be bound by a judgment even though they had no involvement in the litigation or settlement of their claims. Thus, the judicial economy and
efficiencies generated by a class action settlement directly clash with the right of a
litigant—in this case, an absent class member with a claim not directly presented in
the class case—to have due process of law.
By allowing the release of a broad range of claims—including those of unnamed class members—class settlements raise concerns under the due process
clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the U.S. Constitution. Specifically, class settlements pose a risk that the rights of unnamed class members’ claims
will be sacrificed to the advantage of named class representatives. “Generally
speaking, absent class members are not ‘parties’ before the court in the sense of
being able to direct the litigation.” 26 Named class representatives and their counsel
could seek to obtain a better settlement for themselves while “throwing the others’
claims ‘to the winds.’” 27
When a class settlement releases claims that were not raised in the settling
litigation (either intentionally or inadvertently), class members may face preclusion
arguments if they bring later claims in a different action bearing some relation to
the underlying settled claims. In that context, defendants, or plaintiffs if facing
21. See id.; Stanforth v. Farmers Ins. Co. of Ariz., No. CIV 09-1146 RB/RHS, 2014 WL 11497806,
at *3 (D.N.M. Jan. 10, 2014).
22. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e)(2). For a judgment to be enforceable, the judgment must have been
rendered with due process. Pelt, 539 F.3d at 1284 (“The preclusive effect of a prior judgment will depend
upon whether absent class members were ‘in fact’ adequately represented by parties who are present” and
will not bind absent class members “if they were not accorded due process of law”).
23. Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 42–43 (1940); RUBENSTEIN, supra note 5, at §18:1.
24. Taylor v. Sturgell, 553 U.S. 880, 892 (2008) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
25. See id.
26. Williams v. Gen. Elec. Capital Auto Lease, Inc., 159 F.3d 266, 269 (7th Cir. 1998).
27. TBK Partners, 675 F.2d at 462 (“At the heart of our concern was the danger that a class representative not sharing common interests with other class members would ‘endeavor[ ] to obtain a better
settlement by sacrificing the claims of others at no cost to themselves’ by throwing the others’ claims ‘to
the winds.’”).
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counter claims, often argue that the affirmative defenses of res judicata and release
preclude the claims.
Binding these unnamed parties seemingly undercuts the “deep-rooted historic tradition that everyone should have his own day in court.” 28 Balanced against
this historic tradition is the right to notice and the ability to opt out. 29
A release capturing claims neither “presented” nor “presentable” raises issues
regarding the efficacy of notice to absent class members. 30 It may not be readily
apparent that non-presentable claims were to be subsumed within the release. Ineffective notice means that claims will be lost by those unwitting victims who fail to
opt out and thereby protect claims that were neither presented nor presentable.
V. SAFEGUARDING UNNAMED CLASS MEMBERS’ RIGHTS IN CLASS SETTLEMENTS
Given the due process concerns that arise with class settlements, class members when facing preclusion arguments may challenge the enforceability of a class
action judgment on the grounds that the litigation denied them due process of
law. 31 Procedural due process protection in the class context requires: (i) notice plus
an opportunity to be heard and participate in the litigation; (ii) notice that is the
best practicable and reasonably calculated to apprise parties of the action and opportunity to object; (iii) notice that describes the action and rights; (iv) the opportunity to remove oneself from the class and opt out; and (v) adequate representation by the named plaintiff(s) of absent class members’ interests. 32
The due process clauses, along with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(e),
serve as safeguards protecting the release of unnamed putative class members’
claims. 33 Under Rule 23(e), class claims may only be settled or dismissed with the

28. Taylor, 553 U.S. at 892.
29. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(2). Class plaintiffs may seek exclusion from a class certified under Fed. R.
Civ. P. 23(b)(3). See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(2).
30. See Wal-Mart Stores, 396 F.3d at 115–16 (class settlement release considered sufficient
where language of release quoted verbatim, which satisfied due process).
31. Taylor, 553 U.S. at 880 (“The federal common law of preclusion is, of course, subject to due
process limitations.”).
32. Phillips Petro. Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 812 (1985). Class members may challenge a class
settlement on due process grounds by either (i) objecting to or opting out of a class settlement, Shutts, 472
U.S. at 812, or (ii) raising due process in response to an affirmative defense asserted in a second, subsequent
litigation, Williams v. Gen. Elec. Capital Auto Lease, Inc., 159 F.3d 266, 269 (7th Cir. 1998) (“[A]fter the entry
of final judgment, the unnamed class member can raise a collateral attack based on due process . . . .”).
Raising a due process challenge after the settlement has been approved often proves to be more difficult
for class members than opting out or objecting to the settlement on due process grounds before final approval and judgment. This is so because some courts have limited the scope of an individual class member’s
ability to collaterally attack a judgment in a subsequent litigation. Compare Epstein v. MCA, Inc., 179 F.3d
641, 648 (9th Cir. 1999) (“Simply put, the absent class members’ due process right to adequate representation is protected not by collateral review, but by the certifying court initially, and thereafter by appeal within
the state system and by direct review in the United States Supreme Court.”), with Twigg v. Sears, Roebuck
& Co., 153 F.3d 1222, 1226 (11th Cir. 1998) (“Before the bar of claim preclusion may be applied to the claim
of an absent class member, it must be demonstrated that invocation of the bar is consistent with due process, and an absent class member may collaterally attack the prior judgment on the ground that to apply
claim preclusion would deny him due process.”).
33. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e).
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court’s approval. 34 Rule 23(e) imposes certain requirements in approving a proposed settlement:
•
•
•
•
•

The court must direct notice to all class members who would be
bound. 35
The court may approve the settlement binding class members only
after a hearing and a “finding that it is fair, reasonable, and adequate.” 36
The parties must file a statement identifying any agreement made in
connection with the proposed settlement. 37
If the class action was already certified under Rule 23(b)(3), the court
may refuse to approve the settlement unless it allows class members
a new opportunity to request exclusion. 38
Any class member may object to the settlement. 39

Rule 23(e)’s requirement that the court approve the settlement and enter a
finding that the settlement is “fair, reasonable, and adequate” seeks to reinforce
due process of law and ensure adequate representation of class members who have
not participated in shaping the settlement. 40 Courts thus have a duty to ensure that
the settlement is fair and adequate to all potential class members. 41
VI. IDENTICAL FACTUAL PREDICATE AS AN ADDITIONAL SAFEGUARD OF UNNAMED
CLASS MEMBERS’ RIGHTS
Although Rule 23(e) serves as a procedural safeguard on the front end during
the finalization and approval of a class settlement, courts also have established
safeguards on the back end for unnamed class members when a party argues a class
settlement release precludes their claims. A class settlement release will only preclude subsequent claims if the released conduct arises out of the “identical factual
predicate” as the claims at issue in the underlying class litigation. 42 Moreover, adequacy of representation in the underlying litigation also must be found. 43
The Second Circuit, which has developed the most case law on the IFPD, requires the existence of (i) an identical factual predicate and (ii) adequacy of
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e).
40. Id.
41. Grimes v. Vitalink Commc’ns. Corp., 17 F.3d 1553, 1557 (3d Cir. 1994).
42. RUBENSTEIN, supra note 5, at 18:19.
43. E.g., Wal-Mart Stores, 396 F.3d at 106; see Reppert v. Marvin Lumber & Cedar Co., 359 F.3d
53, 58–59 (1st Cir. 2004) (“[A] court-approved settlement containing a release may be applied against a
class member who is not a representative member, even if that member objects to the settlement, so long
as acceptable procedural safeguards have been employed.”) (citing Nottingham Partners v. Trans-Lux Corp.,
925 F.2d 29, 33 (1st Cir. 1991); see also TBK Partners, 675 F.3d at 462 (“these concerns are not implicated
where the released claim rests on the same factual predicate as the class action claim”).
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representation before releasing claims. 44 “Together, these legal constructs allow
plaintiffs to release claims that share the same integral facts as settled claims, provided that the released claims are adequately represented prior to settlement.” 45
Consequently, even if claims do share an identical factual predicate, the claims will
not be precluded unless class plaintiffs also adequately represented the interests of
class members during the underlying litigation. 46 Although other circuits have not
articulated the test in precisely this way, almost all circuits analyze issues of class
release similarly.
The IFPD is particularly important given that a class release may release claims
that were not brought in the class case nor could have been brought. 47 To release
claims that were “not presented and might not have been presentable,” courts require that the released claims share the identical factual predicate underlying the
claims in the class litigation. 48 Otherwise, there would be no limit on the claims that
could be released.
In applying the IFPD, the subsequent court must examine the facts underlying
both cases to determine if they share sufficient facts to justify the release of
claims. 49 Almost every circuit has adopted the IFPD, and no circuit has rejected it. 50
However, without centralized guidance from the Supreme Court, courts have applied varying articulations of what the doctrine means and what level of identity or
similarity of facts is required, particularly in relation to the related defense of res
judicata. To understand how, and why, courts have struggled with the doctrine’s
application, it is important to understand the historical context in which the doctrine arose.
VII. THE HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE IDENTICAL FACTUAL PREDICATE
DOCTRINE AND ITS IMPACT ON THE DOCTRINE’S APPLICABILITY
The IFPD seemingly emerged as courts struggled to apply the principles of issue preclusion to class settlements. To explain how a class settlement release would
preclude subsequent claims, a number of courts analogized release to the affirmative defense of issue preclusion. 51 Although a sister doctrine to claim preclusion,
issue preclusion does not apply in the class settlement context. “Issue preclusion
generally refers to the effect of a prior judgment in foreclosing successive litigation
of an issue of fact or law actually litigated and resolved in a valid court determination essential to the prior judgment, whether or not the issue arises on the same or
44. Wal-Mart Stores, 396 F.3d at 106–07.
45. Id. at 106.
46. Id. at 109 (“Claims arising from a shared set of facts will not be precluded where class plaintiffs have not adequately represented the interests of class members.”).
47. Id. at 106–07.
48. TBK Partners, 675 F.3d at 460 (“We therefore conclude that in order to achieve a comprehensive settlement that would prevent relitigation of settled questions at the core of a class action, a court
may permit the release of a claim based on the identical factual predicate as that underlying the claims in
the settled class action even though the claim was not presented and might not have been presentable in
the class action.”); Reppert, 359 F.3d at 58–59 (citing Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Epstein, 516 U.S.
367, 377 (1996)).
49. See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 396 F.3d at 107–09.
50. See infra note 91 (citing decisions from each Circuit).
51. E.g., TBK Partners, 675 F.2d at 458.
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a different claim.” 52 Generally, for issue preclusion to apply, the prior case must
involve: (1) the same issue; (2) actually litigated or determined; (3) by a valid final
judgment on the merits; (4) in which resolution of the issue was essential to the
judgment; (5) between the same parties to a later suit. 53 As with claim preclusion,
each circuit uses some version of this test, though most jurisdictions no longer require complete mutuality. 54
Because most class actions settle without an issue actually being litigated—let
alone with a finding that that the resolution of the issue was essential to the judgment—few class judgments involve actually litigated issues. 55 As a result, parties
cannot generally rely on issue preclusion to prevent relitigation of claims following
a class settlement. 56 Nevertheless, the IFPD underlying a class settlement release
has its roots in issue preclusion law.
In grappling with IFPD and release, several courts have compared the affirmative defense of release to issue preclusion and applied an issue preclusion test to
determine what claims would be released. The majority of these courts rely on a
Second Circuit case that serves as one of the foundational, and most cited cases, for
IFPD. In TBK Partners, Ltd. v. Western Union Corp., a group of objectors appealed
the approval of a class settlement by a federal court. The objectors argued on appeal that the district court erred in approving the settlement because it would enjoin class members from prosecuting claims that were not part of the class action. 57
The objectors were minority shareholders who disapproved of the merger
price offered by Western Union and the valuation of their shares. 58 The objectors
contended the settlement would bar class members from pursuing appraisal proceedings in state court to determine the fair value of their shares. 59 Thus, the objectors argued a federal court lacked the power to bar claims that were not, and
could not, have been asserted in the class action. 60 They argued appraisal rights
were individual statutory rights inappropriate for class adjudication and the New
York State Supreme Court had exclusive jurisdiction over appraisal proceedings. 61
The Second Circuit rejected that argument and affirmed the decision of the
district court approving the settlement. 62 In doing so, the Second Circuit emphasized the district court could “permit the release of a claim based on the identical
factual predicate as that underlying the claims in the settled class action even
though the claim was not presented and might not have been presentable in the
class action.” 63 The TBK Partners court went through a detailed analysis of the facts
52. New Hampshire, 532 U.S. at 748–49 (emphasis added).
53. HERBERT B. NEWBERG, NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTION § 18.25, at 108 (5th Ed. 2017).
54. See Wright & Miller, Fed. Practice & P., Civil 4464.
55. NEWBERG, supra note 53, § 18.25, at 113.
56. The exception would be if an issue was actually determined before the class settlement and
judgment. See id. at 112–13.
57. TBK Partners, 675 F.2d at 458.
58. See id. at 456.
59. See id.
60. See id.
61. See id.
62. See id.
63. TBK Partners, 675 F.2d at 460.
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and found that both the class action and subsequent state appraisal proceeding
“hinge[d] on the same operative factual predicate”—i.e. the correct valuation of
whatever reversionary interest was owed to Gold & Stock’s shareholders. 64 Because
the same facts were at issue for both the unpleaded released state claims and the
pleaded federal claims, the Second Circuit gave preclusive effect to the settlement’s
release. TBK Partners followed the reasoning of an earlier Second Circuit case—National Super Spuds, Inc. v. New York Mercantile Exchange. There, the Second Circuit
emphasized the basic principle that “[i]f a judgment after trial cannot extinguish
claims not asserted in the class action complaint, a judgment approving a settlement in such an action ordinarily should not be able to do so either.” 65
The test TBK Partners applied in analyzing the release was akin to issue preclusion, not claim preclusion. 66 But in approving the release of claims, TBK Partners
warned that “[c]ourts should be cautious about permitting issue preclusion in the
context of a settlement of a class action.” 67 The Second Circuit further stated:
[A]pproval of a settlement does not call for findings of fact regarding the
claims to be compromised. The court is concerned only with the likelihood
of success or failure, the actual merits of the controversy are not to be
determined. The evidence is limited accordingly. The rules of evidence are
relaxed. The court listens to the advice and wishes of interested parties.
This is not the procedural stuff from which binding determinations of fact
can be drawn. 68
The TBK Partners court’s concern regarding the sacrifice of some claims to obtain a better settlement were “not implicated where the released claim rests on the
same factual predicate as the class action claim.” 69 TBK Partners thus “announced
a principled test for limiting the preclusive effect of a judgment based upon a class
settlement.” 70 Although TBK Partners captioned the analysis it applied as issue preclusion, the Second Circuit did not preclude the claims based on issue preclusion

64. Id. (“It would be hard to imagine a claim that would be more tightly connected to those asserted in the class action than a claim in an appraisal proceeding that Western Union had undervalued the
reversionary interest due Gold & Stock . . . .”).
65. Id. at 461 (quoting Nat’l Super Spuds, Inc. v. N.Y. Mercantile Exch., 660 F.2d 9, 18 (1981); see
also Epstein v. MCA, Inc., 50 F.3d 644, 664 (9th Cir. 1995) (“Epstein I”) (“Had the judgment been based upon
an adjudication rather than a settlement of the federal claims, the unpleaded state law claims would have
been barred by the doctrine of issue preclusion because they turned on the ‘very same set of facts.’”). National Super Spuds did not affirm the district court’s approval of a settlement that would release distinct
claims that depended not only on a different legal theory but also on proof of further facts—the holding of
unliquidated contracts. TBK Partners, 675 F.2d at 460 (citing Nat’l Super Spuds, 660 F.2d at 18).
66. Epstein I, 50 F.3d at 663 (“TBK Partners announced and applied an issue preclusion test, not
an ‘arising out of the same transaction’ test, in defining the limits on a court’s power to release claims in a
class settlement.”).
67. TBK Partners, 675 F.2d at 461.
68. Id. (citing William E. Haudek, The Settlement and Dismissal of Stockholders’ Actions-Part II:
The Settlement, 23 SW. L.J. 765, 809 (1969)).
69. Id. at 462 (concluding district court “exercised the extra vigilance required to ensure that a
settlement’s release of a claim not asserted in the class action does not unfairly disadvantage individual
class members.”).
70. Epstein v. MCA, Inc., 50 F.3d 644, 663 (9th Cir. 1995), rev’d, 516 U.S. 367 (1996).
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because a class settlement release does not involve adjudicated issues. 71 Nevertheless, the Second Circuit’s version of issue preclusion in the class settlement context
served as the foundation for what became the identical factual predicate doctrine.
In Epstein v. MCA, Inc. (“Epstein I”), the Ninth Circuit in analyzing the Second
Circuit’s decision in TBK Partners explained that “had the judgment been based
upon an adjudication rather than a settlement of the federal claims, the unpleaded
state law claims would have been barred by the doctrine of issue preclusion because they turned on the ‘very same set of facts.’” 72 In Epstein I, which was appealed to the Supreme Court in Matsushita, the defendant-appellee argued a Delaware Court of Chancery judgment approving a state class settlement precluded
the federal claims in the pending action. 73 The Ninth Circuit disagreed in Epstein I,
holding the settlement of the Delaware class action did not preclude the class action
at issue. 74
Epstein I declined to directly address the identical factual predicate doctrine. 75
Instead, Epstein I distinguished TBK Partners because it was not a supremacy clause
case and because it applied an issue preclusion test, not an “arising out of the same
transaction” test with regards to the court’s power to release claims in a class settlement. 76 Although the Epstein I court determined Nat’l Super Spuds and TBK Partners “together provide[d] the doctrinal framework for using issue preclusion in determining the limits of judicial authority to release unpleaded claims in settling class
actions,” the court emphasized neither case touched on the issue before it—the
preemptive effect of an exclusive federal jurisdiction statute on the reach of state
judicial power in settling class actions. 77
71. TBK Partners, 675 F.2d at 461.
72. Epstein I, 50 F.3d at 663 (citing TBK Partners, 675 F.2d at 460).
73. Id. at 649.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 663.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 663–64 (distinguishing cases that involved release of unpleaded state claims by federal
district courts which had or may have had pendent jurisdiction to adjudicate claims). The Epstein I Court
determined the federal claims extinguished by the Delaware judgment could not have been extinguished
by the issue preclusive effect of an adjudication of the state claims because they were based upon different
underlying facts. Id. at 665. The Court also determined that because the district court released exclusively
federal claims, a Delaware state judgment was not entitled to full faith and credit. Id. at 666. Because the
Delaware court could not have extinguished the claims through adjudication because it did not have jurisdiction, the judgment was not entitled to full faith and credit. Id. The Supreme Court reversed the Ninth
Circuit’s opinion but did so on different grounds. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Epstein, 516 U.S. 367, 386
(1996) (“The Court of Appeals did not engage in any analysis of Delaware law pursuant to § 1738. Rather,
the Court of Appeals declined to apply § 1738 on the ground that where the rendering forum lacked jurisdiction over the subject matter or the parties, full faith and credit is not required.”). The Supreme Court
determined the Delaware judgment was entitled to full faith and credit even though it released claims
within the exclusive jurisdiction of federal courts. Id. at 368–87. On remand, the Ninth Circuit again held
that the Delaware state judgment was not entitled to full faith and credit because it violated due process
based on the inadequacy of the class representation, but then withdrew its opinion on petition for rehearing. Epstein v. MCA, Inc., 179 F.3d 641, 642 (9th Cir. 1999). The court determined that the Supreme Court’s
holding was premised on the validity of the Delaware judgment. Id. at 644–45 (“While the Court’s explicit
consideration in Matsushita of the due process requirements to bind absent class members admittedly did
not include an express statement that the Delaware judgment in question did not violate due process, that
conclusion was logically necessary to the Court’s holding.”).
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The Epstein I court analyzed two other cases—Grimes v. Vitalink Communications Corp. 78and Nottingham Partners v. Trans-Lux Corp., 79 which did implicate the
supremacy clause because exclusively federal securities claims were released by a
state court judgment approving a class settlement. 80 Epstein I noted the judgments
were given preclusive effect because the state and federal claims arose out of the
identical factual predicate. 81 “In other words, had the judgment followed an adjudication rather than a settlement, it would necessarily have resolved the federal
claims as a matter of issue preclusion.” 82
Epstein I, however, declined to go that far in its holding. 83 Instead, the Ninth
Circuit found that “[a]ll we need decide today is whether to break new ground in
giving preclusive effect that a state court judgment that extinguished exclusively
federal claims that are factually unrelated to the state claims pleaded in the class
action.” 84 To the Ninth Circuit in Epstein I, because the state court did not have jurisdiction—and thus could not have adjudicated the claims—the state court judgment could not have been given preclusive effect. 85 Although the court did not ultimately address identical factual predicate, it approvingly cited the underlying policy of the doctrine, which it found “counsel[s] against an expansive state court
power to release exclusively federal claims.” 86 Specifically:
In applying an issue preclusion test rather than a ‘same transaction’ test,
the cases embrace Judge Friendly’s common sense reasoning that a court’s
jurisdiction to extinguish claims by class settlement should not exceed its
jurisdiction to extinguish claims by adjudication. Ignoring this reasoning,
Matsushita asks us to impose a ‘same transaction’ test without offering
logic or precedent in support of such a test. As we shall now show, the
federal claims extinguished by the Delaware judgment could not have
been extinguished by the issue preclusive effect of an adjudication of the
state claims because, although the federal and state claims arose out of
the same transaction, they are based upon different underlying facts. 87
After proceeding to analyze the facts underlying the claims—and finding that
the only thing they shared in common was that they arose out of the same transaction—the Court ultimately limited its opinion to jurisdiction and full faith and credit,
concluding the state court could not extinguish exclusively federal claims that could

78. Grimes v. Vitalink Commc’ns. Corp., 17 F.3d 1553, 1557 (3d Cir. 1994).
79. Nottingham Partners v. Trans-Lux Corp., 925 F.2d 29 (1st Cir. 1991).
80. Epstein I, 50 F.3d at 664.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id. (noting this was a question of first impression of whether Congress, in denying state courts
subject matter jurisdiction over Securities Exchange Act of 1934 Act claims, intended to leave state courts
with the power to extinguish exclusively federal claims by approving a class settlement that could not have
been extinguished by adjudicating the class action).
85. Id.
86. Epstein I, 50 F.3d at 664.
87. Id. at 664–65.
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not have been extinguished through adjudication. 88 On appeal to the Supreme
Court, the Court rejected Epstein I’s articulation of the adjudication test. 89 Instead,
the Supreme Court held that the Delaware judgment did not bar further prosecution of federal claims under the full faith and credit clause. 90 The Court, however,
did not base its holding on the identical factual predicate doctrine or approve its
application, leaving much to the interpretation of the circuit courts.
VIII. THE BREADTH OF THE IDENTICAL FACTUAL PREDICATE DOCTRINE IN CURRENT
JURISPRUDENCE
The lack of Supreme Court guidance on the IFPD has left its interpretation and
application to the respective circuits. Almost every circuit has applied the IFPD in
the context of a release in a class action settlement, with the exception being the
Fifth Circuit. 91 Although the Tenth Circuit has not applied the IFPD in analyzing the
preclusive effect of a class settlement release, it has acknowledged the existence of
the doctrine and district courts in the Tenth Circuit have applied it, citing to other
circuits. 92
88. Id. at 666 (“[W]e hold that the decree exceeds the jurisdiction of the state court and, therefore, is not entitled to full faith and credit.”).
89. See Matsushita, 516 U.S. at 378.
90. Id. at 386–87.
91. See, e.g., Reppert v. Marvin Lumber and Cedar Co., 359 F.3d 53, 58–59 (1st Cir. 2004) (citing
doctrine but determining that release was “sufficiently broad to encompass the appellants’ complaint and
the allegations therein”); City P’ship Co. v. Atl. Acquisition Ltd., 100 F.3d 1041 (1st Cir. 1996) (citing doctrine
and finding claims stemmed from problems with tender offers and arose from same factual predicate);
Lomeli v. Sec. & Inv. Co. Bahr., 546 F. App’x 37 (2d Cir. 2013) (finding claims shared a single factual predicate); In re Literary Works in Elec. Databases Copyright Litig., 654 F.3d 242, 247–48 (2d Cir. 2011) (“Any
released claims not presented directly in the complaint, however, must be ‘based on the identical factual
predicate as that underlying the claims in the settled class action.’”); Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Visa U.S.A.,
Inc., 396 F.3d 96, 106 (2d Cir. 2005) (“Plaintiffs in a class action may release claims that were or could have
been pled in exchange for settlement relief. Plaintiffs’ authority to release claims is limited by the ‘identical
factual predicate’ and ‘adequacy of representation’ doctrines. Together, these legal constructs allow plaintiffs to release claims that share the same integral facts as settled claims, provided that the released claims
are adequately represented prior to settlement.”); Freeman v. MML Bay State Life Ins. Co., 445 F. App’x 577,
579 (3d Cir. 2011) (“The key inquiry is whether the factual predicate for future claims is identical to the
factual predicate underlying the settlement agreement.”); Berry v. Schulman, 807 F.3d 600, 616 (4th Cir.
2015) (finding claims based on same product that enables debt collectors to locate assets were released);
Moulton v. U.S. Steel Corp., 581 F.3d 344, 349 (6th Cir. 2009) (“The question is not whether the definition
of the claim in the complaint and the definition of the claim in the release overlap perfectly; it is whether
the released claims share a ‘factual predicate’ with ‘the claims pled in the complaint.’”); Williams v. Gen.
Elec. Capital Auto Lease, Inc., 159 F.3d 266, 269 (7th Cir. 1998) (finding claims were based on identical factual
predicate involving leases and potential for an early termination penalty); Williams v. Boeing Co., 517 F.3d
1120, 1133 (9th Cir. 2008) (citing identical factual predicate doctrine and finding claims do not arise from
same “‘conduct, transaction, or occurrence’”); cf. Thompson v. Edward D. Jones & Co., 992 F.2d 187, 191
n.6 (8th Cir. 1993) (noting that suitability claims rested on same or similar facts as class action claims, but
not citing identical factual predicate doctrine specifically); Hesse v. Sprint Corp., 598 F.3d 581, 591 (9th Cir.
2010) (finding claims did not share an identical factual predicate with claims resolved in class settlement,
but overlapping discussion with doctrine of res judicata); Thomas v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield Ass’n, 333 F.
App’x 414 (11th Cir. 2009) (conflating release and res judicata and citing identical factual predicate doctrine).
92. See In re Motor Fuel Temperature Sales Practices Litig., 872 F.3d 1094, 1115 (10th Cir. 2017)
(declining to consider argument on release of claims based on identical factual predicate when not raised
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The existing circuit case law highlights the ambiguity of whether the doctrine
would apply under both release and res judicata. At a glance, an “identical factual
predicate” appears to be a stricter standard than the factual element of res judicata—i.e. same transaction or occurrence. The same transaction or occurrence factor under res judicata typically requires meeting several criteria, including showing
a common nucleus of operative fact. 93 A class settlement release, on the other
hand, requires identity of fact. 94 And, at least in the Ninth Circuit, an identical factual predicate means both the same set of facts (the predicate) and the same injury. 95
Some courts have interpreted identical factual predicate to be narrower than
the more relaxed standard of same transaction or occurrence under res judicata. 96
The Ninth Circuit in Epstein I certainly viewed the factual identity required as separate and distinct from the “same transaction or occurrence.” 97
But other courts have not viewed the factual similarity required as different,
often using the “identical factual predicate” and “common nucleus of operative
in district court). A number of Tenth Circuit district courts have applied the identical factual predicate doctrine, citing Second Circuit cases. E.g., Stanforth v. Farmers Ins. Co. of Ariz., No. CIV 09-1146 RB/RHS, 2014
WL 11497806, at *4 (D.N.M. Jan. 10, 2014) (“emphasizing that “[i]t is well-established that ‘a court may
permit the release of a claim based on the identical factual predicate as that underlying the claims in the
settled class action” and finding that cases are based on same factual predicate); Ali v. Wells Fargo Bank,
No. CIV-13-876-D, 2014 WL 819385 (W.D. Okla. March 3, 2014) (finding stay appropriate where if class settlement approved, it would likely prevent class members from subsequently asserting claims relying on a
different legal theory than that relied on in the class action, but depending upon same factual predicate);
Wallace B. Roderick Revocable Living Tr. v. XTO Energy, Inc., 679 F. Supp. 2d 1287, 1308 (D. Kan. 2010) (“class
action releases may include claims not presented and even those which could not have been presented as
long as the released conduct arises out of the ‘identical factual predicate’ as the settled conduct.”) (quoting
Wal-Mart Stores, 396 F.3d at 107).
93. E.g., Apotex, Inc. v. FDA, 393 F.3d 210, 217 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (“Whether two cases implicate
the same cause of action turns on whether they share the same nucleus of facts.”) (internal quotations
omitted); Nordhorn v. Ladish Co., 9 F.3d 1402, 1405 (9th Cir. 1993) (laying out criteria for whether two
claims are the same for purposes of res judicata, including whether they arise out of the same transactional
nucleus of facts).
94. Reyn’s Pasta Bella, LLC v. Visa USA, Inc., 442 F.3d 741, 748 (9th Cir. 2006).
95. Id. at 749 (holding claims released because price-fixing conduct and “the underlying injury
are identical”); In re W. States Wholesale Nat. Gas Antitrust Litig., 752 F. App’x 560, 562 (9th Cir. 2018)
(question of whether Plaintiff was injured forms part of factual predicate); Hesse, 598 F.3d at 589 (holding
release was not enforceable to bar claims “brought to remedy a different set of injuries. . .”); see also McKinney-Drobnis v. Massage Envy Franchising, LLC, No. 16-cv-06450-MMC, 2017 WL 1246933, at *5 (N.D. Cal.
Apr. 5, 2017) (finding claims not barred by prior settlement where based on different breaches and different
injuries); Anderson v. Nextel Retail Stores, LLC, 2010 WL 8591002, at *4 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 12, 2010) (“The Ninth
Circuit concluded that ‘[w]hile Plaintiffs seek to hold Defendant liable by positing a different theory of anticompetitive conduct, the price-fixing predicate (price-fixing interchange rates) and the underlying injury are
identical.’”) (quoting Reyn’s Pasta, 442 F.3d at 749); Cancilla v. Ecolab Inc., No. C 12-03001 CRB, 2014 WL
2943237, at *7 (N.D. Cal. June 30, 2014) (“As already discussed, the Cancilla claims depend upon the same
set of facts as Ladore . . . and both actions’ underlying injuries of unpaid overtime are identical—thus, this
case shares an identical factual predicate as Ladore.”).
96. At least two courts have found the doctrine hinges on proof. For example, one court in the
Second Circuit found if claims depend upon proof of further facts, there would be a separate factual predicate and identical factual predicate could not be met. Burgess v. Citigroup Inc., 624 F. App’x 6, 9 (2d Cir.
2015) (“distinct claims that depend ‘upon proof of further facts’ constitute a ‘separate factual predicate.’”);
see In re W. States Wholesale Nat. Gas Antitrust Litig., 725 F. App’x 560 (9th Cir. 2018).
97. Epstein v. MCA, Inc., 50 F.3d 644, 665 (9th Cir. 1995) (“[A]lthough the federal and state claims
arose out of the same transaction, they are based upon different underlying facts.”).
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fact” terms interchangeably. 98 For example, the Ninth Circuit in Class Plaintiffs v.
City of Seattle—a case three years before Epstein I—reasoned that “[t]he weight of
authority holds that a federal court may release not only those claims alleged in the
complaint, but also a claim ‘based on the identical factual predicate as that underlying the claims in the settled class action . . . .’” 99 Yet, in Class Plaintiffs’ analysis,
the court found the claims asserted in the two actions “arise from the same common nucleus of operative fact” and could therefore be released. 100
The Ninth Circuit in Hesse v. Sprint Corp. set forth a similarly convoluted analysis of release that also overlapped with res judicata. 101 In Hesse, the district court
granted Sprint’s motion for summary judgment after finding that the suit was
barred by a class settlement between Sprint and its customers approved by a Kansas state court (the “Benney Settlement”). 102 The Benney Settlement resulted from
allegations that Sprint’s surcharges to recoup federal regulatory fees violated consumer protection laws, were a breach of contract, and resulted in unjust enrichment. 103 The district court accepted Sprint’s argument that the plaintiffs’ claims fell
within the broad release of liability in the Benney Settlement. 104
The Ninth Circuit reversed. 105 First, the Ninth Circuit emphasized that “[a] settlement agreement may preclude a party from bringing a related claim in the future
‘even though the claim was not presented and might not have been presentable in
the class action,’ but only where the released claim is ‘based on the identical factual
predicate as that underling the claims in the settled class action.’” 106 The Ninth Circuit cited several cases as examples of precedent holding that courts may properly
release claims not alleged in the underlying complaint where those claims depended on the same set of facts as the claims that gave rise to the settlement. 107
The Hesse court then shifted its focus and discussed whether Kansas law “is guided
by the same general principles” of claim preclusion as the Ninth Circuit. 108 In analyzing whether claim preclusion would apply, the court noted the claims did “not
share an identical factual predicate with the claims resolved in the Benney settlement.” 109 Yet, in concluding that the claims lacked an identical factual predicate,
the court emphasized that the Washington claims were “not derived from the same
‘transaction or occurrence’ as the claims” in Benney, seemingly reverting to a res
judicata factual standard. 110 The court, however, ultimately rooted its opinion in the
doctrine of release and adequacy of representation. 111
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.

See Class Plaintiffs v. Seattle, 955 F.2d 1268 (9th Cir. 1992).
Id. at 1287–88 (quoting TBK Partners, 675 F.2d at 460).
Id. at 1288.
See generally Hesse v. Sprint Corp., 598 F.3d 581 (9th Cir. 2010).
Id. at 585.
Id.
Id. at 597.
Id. at 592.
Id. at 590 (quoting Williams v. Boeing Co., 517 F.3d 1120, 1133 (9th Cir. 2008)).
Hesse, 598 F.3d at 590.
Id. at 581.
Id. at 591.
Id. at 592.
Id. at 584.
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The Eleventh Circuit in Thomas v. Blue Cross and Blue Shield Ass’n used the
identical factual predicate and common nucleus of operative fact tests interchangeably. 112 The Eleventh Circuit, however, adopted a different approach than Class
Plaintiffs, but similar to that of Hesse. The Thomas court applied the IFPD when
analyzing res judicata (claim preclusion), not release. 113 After finding the first three
elements of res judicata were not disputed—i.e. final judgment on the merits, rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction, and identity of parties—the court analyzed whether the causes of action were the same. 114 The physician counterclaimant argued Blue Cross must show an identical factual predicate for claim preclusion
to apply. 115 The court found that “an ‘identical factual predicate’ requires only a
common nucleus of operative fact.” 116 The Court concluded that the actions
“share[d] the same operative nucleus of fact” and that “the district court did not
err in finding that [the defendant’s] counterclaims were released by the settlement
agreement after he failed to opt out.” 117
Despite the conflation of the two tests by some courts, identical factual predicate is not the same as “same transaction or occurrence” or “common nucleus of
operative fact.” As the court in Epstein I observed, claims can arise “out of the same
transaction, [but be] based upon different underlying facts.” 118 For example, although the Ninth Circuit in Reorganized FLI, Inc. v. OneOK, Inc. found a prior class
action and a subsequent litigation both challenged manipulative trading practices
that allegedly inflated the price of natural gas, the court found the class settlement
release from the prior action was not enforceable against the plaintiff in the subsequent litigation under the identical factual predicate rule. 119 The Ninth Circuit emphasized that “even if those elements of the factual predicates of each claim are
identical, the question whether [the plaintiff] was injured by Defendants—as well
as the follow-on questions of when, and where, and how—are also part of the factual predicate of [the plaintiff’s] claims made here.” 120 Because the two cases “depend[ed] on proof of different facts to establish a different injury,” the defendants
in the subsequent litigation were not entitled to judgment as a matter of law on
their affirmative defense of release. 121
To be sure, the identical factual predicate doctrine applies in the context of
res judicata where there has been a class action settlement. But IFPD does not fall
under the same transaction or occurrence prong. Instead, an identical factual predicate is part of the valid, final judgment prong of res judicata.
When faced with a class settlement, the court must approve the settlement
under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e). 122 In approving a settlement, the court must accept the
112. Thomas v. Blue Cross Blue Shield Ass’n, 333 F. App’x 414, 417–18 (11th Cir 2009).
113. Id. at 417.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Thomas, 333 F. App’x at 417 (citing Adams v. S. Farm Bureau Life Ins. Co., 493 F.3d 1276,
1289 (11th Cir. 2007)).
117. Thomas, 333 F. App’x at 419–20.
118. Epstein v. MCA, Inc., 50 F.3d 644, 665 (9th Cir. 1995).
119. In re W. States Wholesale Nat. Gas Antitrust Litig., 725 F. App’x 560, 562 (9th Cir. 2018).
120. Id. at 563 (citing Hesse, 598 F.3d at 581 (9th Cir. 2010)).
121. Id. at 563.
122. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e).
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release. 123 Once the release and settlement have been approved, and only then,
the Court may enter its final judgment. 124 As a result, to reach a final judgment, a
Court must approve the release, which is limited to foreclosing only those claims
that share an identical factual predicate. 125 Even a reviewing court must apply the
IFPD to limit the sweep of a broad release. 126 Thus, the identical factual predicate
doctrine is embedded within the analytical framework that underlies the final judgment element of res judicata.
The Ninth Circuit in Reyn’s Pasta Bella, LLC v. Visa USA, Inc. applied a similar
analysis as proposed, though under the rubric of issue preclusion, not claim preclusion. 127 In analyzing whether an action was barred by a class settlement, the court
explained that:
Issue preclusion bars relitigation of issues adjudicated in an earlier proceeding if three requirements are met: (1) the issue necessarily decided at
the previous proceeding is identical to the one which is sought to be relitigated; (2) the first proceeding ended with a final judgment on the merits;
and (3) the party against whom collateral estoppel is asserted was a party
or in privity with a party at the first proceeding. 128
The Reyn’s Pasta court found the underlying class court’s decision that the
settlement released the plaintiff’s claims was necessary to the court’s final judgment approving the settlement. 129 To approve the settlement under Rule 23(e)(2),
“the Wal-Mart courts necessarily had to adjudicate the objections Plaintiffs raised,
including whether the Wal-Mart settlement released Plaintiffs’ price-fixing
claims.” 130
The Reyn’s Pasta court alternatively found that, even if issue preclusion were
not applicable, the claims were released by virtue of the identical factual predicate
doctrine. 131 Although the cases involved different legal theories of antitrust liability,
the court concluded the price-fixing predicate based on interchange rates and the
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. See TBK Partners LTD. v. W. Union Corp., 675 F.2d 456, 460 (7th Cir. 1982); Reppert v. Marvin
Lumber and Cedar Co., 359 F.3d 53, 58–59 (1st Cir. 2004).
127. Reyn’s Pasta Bella, LLC v. Visa USA, Inc., 442 F.3d 741, 744 (9th Cir. 2006).
128. Id. at 746 (citing Kourtis v. Cameron, 419 F.3d 989, 994 (9th Cir. 2005)).
129. Reyn’s Pasta differs from many class settlements in that many of the issues raised in the
subsequent litigation were actually litigated in the underlying class action. During the underlying class fairness hearing approving the settlement, the parties litigated “virtually all of the issues they raise[d]” in the
subsequent litigation. Reyn’s Pasta, 442 F.3d at 746 n.6. The court took judicial notice of the briefs in the
prior action and the transcript from the fairness hearing that showed the litigated issues. Id. Because the
issues were actually litigated in the prior class case, the determination of the issues was found to be necessary to the final judgment, thus satisfying two important prongs of issue preclusion. See id.
130. Reyn’s Pasta, 442 F.3d at 746 (noting that plaintiffs in underlying suit litigated “virtually all of
the issues they raise here” in the fairness hearing).
131.
Id. at 748 (quoting Class Plaintiffs v. Seattle, 955 F.2d 1268, 1287–89 (9th Cir. 1992)) (“The
weight of authority holds that a federal court may release not only those claims alleged in the complaint,
but also a claim ‘based on the identical factual predicate as that underlying the claims in the settled class
action . . .’”).
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underlying injury were identical. 132 “Thus, the [earlier class settlement] release encompasses Plaintiffs’ claims if they arise from an identical factual predicate as the
claims asserted by the [earlier] class.” 133
IX. BOTH RELEASE AND RES JUDICATA ARE CIRCUMSCRIBED BY IFPD
This reasoning of Reyn’s Pasta—albeit in the issue preclusion context—should
influence the reasoning all courts employ when considering arguments that later
claims are precluded by res judicata and release. If a party asserts res judicata based
on a prior class settlement as a defense, the party must meet its burden of meeting
the elements of res judicata, including that the previous court entered a final judgment. For the prior court entering a final judgment to approve the class settlement,
it necessarily could only approve a settlement release that extended as far as claims
sharing an identical factual predicate. Thus, the final judgment prong of res judicata
is circumscribed by IFPD.
As a result, a court faced with the defenses of res judicata and release should
start its analysis based on the identical factual predicate doctrine. If an identity of
facts is not shown, a party asserting res judicata and release should not prevail on
either doctrine.
X. CONCLUSION
The release of unnamed class members’ claims in a class settlement raises due
process concerns that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and development of federal common law, seek to minimize. Thus, although broad releases of claims in the
class settlement context are generally permitted, a release will not automatically
preclude subsequent claims touching on the same facts as the underlying litigation
unless the parties can demonstrate an identical factual predicate. 134 The identical
factual predicate doctrine, however, has been subject to various interpretations
and applications by the circuits. Under these varying interpretations, courts have
not been clear whether the doctrine also applies in the context of res judicata or
whether identical factual predicate has the same meaning as the same transaction
or occurrence element.
Finding an identical factual predicate is necessary to determining whether res
judicata or release preclude claims. Courts have emphasized that a release may only
release claims that share an identical factual predicate, and not beyond. Thus, a
court cannot approve a class settlement release and consequently the settlement
unless it determines the release will not extend beyond the boundaries of IFPD. In
entering a final judgment approving a class settlement, the court makes the necessary determination that the release does not capture claims that do not share an
identical factual predicate. This final judgment then later serves as one of the
prongs in asserting a res judicata defense. Consequently, the identical factual predicate is a necessary prerequisite for both res judicata and class settlement release
defenses.

132.
133.
134.

Id. at 749.
Id. at 748.
Adequacy of representation must also be found.

